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CO-OPERATION IN THE AGE OF HOBBY LOBBY: WHEN SINCERITY IS NOT ENOUGH 
 
David S. Oderberg, Department of Philosophy, University of Reading 
 
 
At the time of writing, it has just been announced that the federal Office for Civil 
Rights has upheld the California Department of Managed Health Care’s instruction to health 
insurers covering employees of churches, religiously-affiliated schools and universities, and 
other religious organisations, that they must cover abortion in their plans under the 
Affordable Care Act – irrespective of any objections by the plan purchasers.1 
This Californian problem has been rumbling on for several years, and the latest 
ruling reaffirms the state government’s attitude: conscientious objection has no force 
against the provision of abortion via Obamacare. Needless to say, the complaint will run its 
course through the courts, but it seems, given previous judicial rulings, that only the 
Supreme Court can save conscientious objection in California. 
In such a blatant case as this, it is clear that the plan purchasers would be 
compelled to co-operate in wrongdoing. (I leave aside the substantive question of the 
morality of abortion, which is another topic. The objectors sincerely believe that abortion is 
wrong, so let us assume it to be wrong for the purpose of analysis.) But what does co-
operation in wrongdoing amount to, and how to do we judge what kinds of co-operation are 
themselves morally objectionable? The primary distinction is between formal and material 
co-operation.2 In formal co-operation, the co-operator intends the wrong committed by the 
                                                     
1 http://www.adfmedia.org/files/CDMHCInvestigationClosureLetter.pdf 
2 My original paper on the topic is ‘The Ethics of Co-operation in Wrongdoing’, in A. O'Hear 
(ed.) Modern Moral Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004; Royal 
Institute of Philosophy Annual Lecture Series 2002-3): 203-27. This paper was cited in the 
majority judgment of the U.S. Supreme Court in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby (2014; 
Official publication at Expositions, https://shrtm.nu/arxs. 
 2 
principal agent, even if he does not intend to perform it himself and even if he does not 
believe the principal act is wrong.3 In other words, he shares the guilt of the principal. The 
Californian case is clear: the plan purchasers do not intend either for the insurer to cover 
abortion or for any abortion to be performed.  
So they count as material co-operators. Here, the relevant principles are those 
governing the doctrine of double effect in general (DDE).4 Why so? Because the agential 
structure is the same as in double-effect cases: the agent intentionally performs an act with 
both good and bad effects, something that may well be permitted if the right conditions 
apply even though doing good and avoiding evil is the fundamental principle of morality. 
First, what the agent does must itself be at least morally permissible. Secondly, the agent 
must not intend the bad effect itself. Third, the bad effect must not itself be a means to the 
good one, for otherwise the agent would be using a bad means to a good end. Finally, there 
must be some kind of proportionality between the good and bad effects,  sufficient to 
permit the causation of the latter for the sake of5 the former. Proportionality is not 
essentially a balancing of outcomes as per consequentialism, but rather an answer to the 
question: Are there good enough reasons for permitting the bringing about of the bad 
effect, in terms of what is achieved by production of the good effect? 
                                                     
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/13-354_olp1.pdf), Slip Op: 36, n.34 [last 
accessed 4 July 2016]. 
3 Hence a formal co-operator does approve the wrongful act, but can do so even if they 
don’t see it as wrong. A person might think it just fine to rape someone as an act of revenge, 
say, and so approve the act, without thinking the act wrongful. In other words, approval of 
the wrongful act does not entail thinking of it as wrong, and in fact usually occurs in 
conjunction with the belief that it is somehow justified. 
4 For an outline and defence of PDE, see my Moral Theory (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000): ch.3, as 
well as my ‘The Doctrine of Double Effect’, in T. O'Connor and C. Sandis (eds) A Companion 
to the Philosophy of Action (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010): 324-30. 
5 To repeat, not as a means to. 
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Here, it seems fairly clear that the first condition is violated because the act of the 
plan purchaser is to purchase health insurance for employees that covers abortion. As an 
act, it is no more morally permissible than a doctor’s signing a certificate authorising 
someone else to perform an abortion. But even if the co-operative act (purchasing the 
insurance) were considered permissible, there would be a question over the fourth 
condition. The bad effect is co-operation in the provision of abortion. The good effect is the 
avoidance of the severe penalties of non-compliance with the Affordable Care Act and 
related state laws and regulations. The penalties might be sufficient (let us suppose) to put 
the plan purchaser out of business or stop their effective functioning (a church, say). This is 
a great evil, but it is not a threat to life or limb; abortion, on the other hand, is a direct 
attack upon life. (Again, we are supposing this for the purpose of analysis.) So there seems 
to be a clear disproportionality between the good and bad effects. 
Yet condition 4 is not merely about weighing effects, however this is done. The 
good effect of avoiding the severe penalties for non-compliance is substantial, though not as 
substantial as the evil effect of taking a life. This does not of itself rule out or in the co-
operative act. What it means is that the co-operator needs a greater reason for assisting the 
principal than he would were the good and bad effects comparable. Environmentalists like 
to tell us that taking the car needs greater justification when the good effect does not 
significantly exceed the bad effect of the extra pollution than when the good effect is 
substantially greater.6 Compare taking the car on a walkable trip to buy milk versus taking 
your child on a long journey to the hospital. It is, of course, easy to imagine cases where the 
disproportionality is so great that nothing can justify co-operation: if I threaten not to be 
                                                     
6 A classic double-effect case. One can think of similar cases if this sort of example does not 
convince. 
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your friend unless you help me beat up an old lady, it is hard to see what reason could 
compensate for the massive lack of balance between effects.  
  When it comes to working out what sort of reason can justify certain behaviour in 
a given situation, the question in co-operation cases is how the effects relate to the co-
operator’s action: the more the co-operator is implicated in the principal act, the graver the 
reason they need for co-operating. Someone who edits pornography movies prior to sale, 
for instance, needs greater reason for co-operation than someone who sells the cameras. 
The former is a more proximate co-operator than the latter. Proximity is a factor in 
implication: it is not only, and sometimes not at all, about spatio-temporal distance between 
the principal agent and the co-operator. It is about the executive character of the co-
operative act, in other words whether, morally speaking, the co-operator is more like the 
principal in what they do than someone else actually or hypothetically situated in the same 
chain of events. Proximity is not an absolute matter; one is more or less proximate relative 
to others, or to how oneself or another might have been situated. Now entering into a 
contract to provide insurance coverage for abortion, although not as proximate as assisting 
the abortionist in the clinic, is more proximate than, say, typing up the contract and posting 
it to the insurer. Indeed, in activities where insurable risk is present, providing the insurance 
is one of the key factors that supports the risky activity itself, allowing it to be carried out in 
confidence of protection. One of the motivating ideas behind the ACA is that ‘reproductive 
rights’, as they are called, be given ‘seamless coverage’.7 Insurance provides the backstop 
                                                     
7 The term ‘seamless coverage’ is used in connection with the ‘contraceptive mandate’, but 
obviously applies equally to abortion, as far as the Government is concerned (and note that 
objectors to the contraceptive mandate have sometimes focused on the abortifacient 
contraceptives in particular, as in Hobby Lobby): see oral argument in Zubik v. Burwell, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/14-1418_1bn2.pdf, 
at pp.19, 20, 32, 42, 48, 60, 83 [last accessed 4 July 2016]. 
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whereby abortion can be carried out without fear of cost or administrative burden. 
Therefore, as well as protecting the act in general, the insurance protects particular acts at 
particular times. This gives the insurance, as with most insurance, an executive character 
putting it very close to the activity itself. 
Moreover, the co-operation looks to be indispensable, in the following way. It is not 
that indispensable co-operation has to be an absolute sine qua non of the principal act, in 
the sense that without it the act simply cannot be performed short of a miracle. It is, rather, 
that the principal act, practically speaking, cannot be performed, or would be performed 
with great difficulty, or would have its probability significantly lowered without the co-
operation. Providing the burglar with the code to a safe that only you know is as 
indispensable as can be, assuming no other means of access. Handing the burglar the keys 
to your car is dispensable, assuming the burglar could threaten anyone else to do the same. 
Again, there is a spectrum of cases: we are not dealing with mathematics but with ethics, 
and as we cannot repeat too often, Aristotle taught us not to expect more precision that the 
subject matter allows.  
Now, though, we have a problem: What is it that a hypothetical employee of the 
plan purchaser might want? Is it abortion? Is it abortion without cost-sharing? Is it abortion 
without cost-sharing while remaining an employee of the purchaser? We have to look at all 
the circumstances and ask ourselves what exactly the plan purchaser would be helping the 
employee to do. Two important questions to ask here are: What does the employee want 
help with, and what does the employer think they are helping with? It seems pretty clear 
that, given the purpose of the ACA and of employee health plans generally and given the 
situation of the parties, by purchasing the coverage the employer is helping the employee 
get trouble-free and cost-free abortion coverage as an employee. As such, the employer’s 
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co-operation is well nigh indispensable, practically speaking, even though in the current 
situation the employee could make alternative arrangements with difficulty. 
There is a lot more that could be said about the California case and its specifics. My 
purpose has been to show that there is a principled way of looking at co-operation cases 
that does not involve appeal to religious doctrine or expression per se and that is not wholly 
subjective. Here, the employer looks to be a proximate and indispensable material co-
operator in wrongdoing by providing the coverage, assuming for the sake of argument that 
the initial act of purchasing the coverage is itself permissible (an assumption I in fact deny). 
As such, it would be morally wrong to purchase the coverage, and the state would be 
compelling the objector to engage in immoral behaviour. As in UK cases, where Catholic 
adoption agencies have all but ceased functioning as such due to government compulsion to 
pair children with homosexual couples,8 it would be incumbent on the Californian objectors 
to submit to the penalties even if it meant going out of business or radically changing the 
nature of their operation. 
The situation is similar to that in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, where a ‘closely-held for 
profit corporation’ was granted an exemption from purchasing employee coverage under 
the ‘contraceptive mandate’, particularly with reference to abortifacient drugs. As is well 
known, the Supreme Court held that the mandate substantially burdened the freedom of 
religion of the employers under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993 (RFRA). 
Unfortunately, though, matters start to get even thornier than many observers of the 
                                                     
8 Some have closed while others have disaffiliated from the church in order to continue 
providing gay adoption and hence maintain charitable status under the law. See 
http://www.catholicherald.co.uk/commentandblogs/2013/07/04/how-many-catholic-
adoption-societies-have-actually-closed-down-and-how-many-are-now-quietly-handing-
children-over-to-gay-adoptive-parents/ [last accessed 4 July 2016]. 
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current state of play think they already are. For whilst I agree with the decision in Hobby 
Lobby, I do not think the case was decided for the right reasons. Yes, the plaintiffs were 
compelled by the mandate to become illicit co-operators in wrongdoing; and perhaps, given 
the RFRA jurisprudence, the case was correctly interpreted. If it was, though, then that 
jurisprudence is in my view wrong, as I go on to explain. In any case, the reasoning in Hobby 
Lobby has led to the impasse over Zubik v. Burwell, in which SCOTUS reversed the previous 
decisions per curiam and sent the case back to the lower courts where, at the time of 
writing, it lies.9 
The problem centres on the question of how a conscientious objector’s belief about 
co-operation is to be understood. Is it a religious/conscientious10 belief, or is it a belief that 
we might call ancillary to a religious belief, perhaps one that is derived from a mixture of 
religious and non-religious beliefs? We need to get clear about the structure of a standard 
case of Hobby Lobby-style conscientious objection. There is a principal act that the objector 
sincerely believes contravenes their religious beliefs. Abortion is the most common case 
post-ACA (including abortifacient ‘contraception’). In other words, taking the Christian 
context – for it seems to be Christians litigating the most frequently – it is an accepted 
Christian doctrine that abortion is immoral. The objector believes that doctrine. Clearly, 
                                                     
9 https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/15pdf/14-1418_8758.pdf [last accessed 27 July 
2016]. 
10 I will usually refer only to ‘religious’ belief since the bulk of the jurisprudence in the area 
concerns religious freedom, and after all the key legislation is the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act. Nevertheless, the same issues apply to conscientious objection in general, 
where the grounds are generically ethical rather than specifically religious. I will, however, 
continue to speak of ‘conscientious objection’ as well as ‘religious objection’ since the 
former is standard terminology even in the religious context. 
Official publication at Expositions, https://shrtm.nu/arxs. 
 8 
then, the belief is a belief that is essentially religious in nature, one derived from religious 
teaching.11 Call this the primary belief – the one involving disapproval of the principal act. 
In addition, there is the objector’s belief – call it secondary – that co-operating with 
the primary act is itself immoral. Is this secondary belief itself a religious belief? Well, if the 
objector can show that the belief is somehow embodied in religious teaching, then it too 
will be a religious belief. For example, certain kinds of co-operation in wrongdoing are 
condemned by old-style moral theology manuals of the Catholic Church.12 The 
condemnation is not idiosyncratic, but was (and perhaps is) accepted as standard moral 
theological teaching across the texts used in seminaries, schools, and universities. We can 
presume that something roughly similar applies in many Christian churches; indeed, 
plaintiffs in the recent cases have been either Catholic or of various Protestant 
denominations. 
Not every kind of co-operation is wrong, however, whether by religious or non-
religious lights. So it is not as though a plaintiff can simply say, for example: ‘Co-operation in 
abortion is wrong, as taught by my church. By purchasing employee health coverage for 
abortion I would be co-operating in abortion. Therefore my religious freedom is being 
violated.’ To repeat, not every kind of co-operation in wrongdoing is itself wrong. Hence 
there must be an implied tertiary belief involved, e.g: purchasing health insurance for 
abortion is a wrongful form of co-operation. What should we say about this sort of belief? 
The specific example is relatively uncontentious, as I have already claimed: purchasing such 
coverage (at least as I have assumed it to be in the Californian scenario) is proximate, 
                                                     
11 Whether or not the objector also believes abortion is wrong for non-religious reasons. 
12 An excellent overview of the teaching can be found in J.A. McHugh and C.J. Callan, Moral 
Theology: A Complete Course, vol. 1 (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, Inc., 1958): 615-41. The 
references by Alito J in n.34 of Hobby Lobby are also pertinent sources. 
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indispensable co-operation and, as such, wrong. Now, the theological textbooks agree on 
the principles, and usually on their application, albeit the purchase of health insurance is not 
exactly a staple of books from the 1950s and 1960s, where co-operation is discussed 
extensively. But even if they all said, or if some approved religious authority said, that 
purchasing health coverage for abortion was illicit co-operation, in my view this would not 
itself be a religious belief and protected as such by RFRA and the associated jurisprudence. 
Why not? The reason is that the application of religious principles to particular facts 
is not itself a matter of religious belief or teaching, even if all religious authorities make the 
same application in the same way and say so in their texts. More specifically, applying 
principles of co-operation – even ones that are a matter of religious teaching – to the facts 
of a particular case is a matter of logic, prudence, and common sense, not a matter of 
religious belief. When theologians, or religious authorities, apply the principles of co-
operation to particular cases, they are neither explaining existing religious teaching nor 
amplifying it. They are using logic, prudence, and common sense to derive particular 
conclusions about particular cases. Now, maybe a trained theologian can do this better than 
the man in the street, but something is not ipso facto a theological matter because it is done 
by a theologian. 
To see this more clearly, we have to recognise that the principles of co-operation, 
minus questions of wrongdoing, apply just as well to cases of perfectly acceptable 
behaviour. For instance, I co-operate formally with your mowing the lawn when I plug the 
brand new mower in for you and show you how to use it. You co-operate materially with my 
buying a six-pack of beer by lending me the money because you are my friend, knowing that 
beer is what I am going to buy, but not intending for me to buy it – say due to worries that I 
might not be sober enough for work the next morning. If you have forgotten the password 
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to your computer and I alone know it, I co-operate indispensably with you by reminding you 
what it is. You co-operate proximately with my driving to the shop by filling up my car with 
petrol for me. My co-operation with your going for a jog is remote when I merely offer to 
pick up your children from school for you. And so on. 
In other words, the application of general principles of co-operation to particular 
cases straddles both wrong and permissible behaviour. The application itself is morally 
neutral, nor is it a matter of religious doctrine. One can apply the principles without 
knowing or caring about religion, and without knowing that the principles themselves are 
theological in nature. In fact, although my argument does not hang on this, I doubt that 
even the principles themselves – e.g., that formal co-operation in wrongdoing is itself wrong 
– are essentially theological. Rather, theologians have codified what seems to be part of 
common-sense moral reasoning, just as the Doctrine of Double Effect, despite its 
codification in religious textbooks, is itself a piece of common-sense moral reasoning. 
In any case, recognising that the application of the principles of co-operation is not 
itself a religious matter is essential to seeing what went wrong with Hobby Lobby and now 
bedevils the theory of co-operation in the wake of that important case. For it is settled law 
that no court can look behind the sincerity of a person’s religious beliefs when the person 
objects to an infringement of their freedom of religion, whether under RFRA or under the 
Constitution more generally. As the majority point out in Hobby Lobby, in respect of the 
sincere belief of the owners of the relevant corporations that providing coverage under the 
contraceptive mandate violated their religious beliefs, ‘it is not for us to say that their 
religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial’, only to determine that the objectors have an 
Official publication at Expositions, https://shrtm.nu/arxs. 
 11 
‘honest conviction’ that this is so.13 This has long been the legal position as far as religious 
beliefs are concerned.14 
If, then, the belief of an objector that by doing X they are co-operating illicitly in 
some other act Y is itself a religious belief, no court is allowed to look behind the sincerity 
with which it is held. In other words, no court is allowed to assess the reasonableness of the 
belief. Now in the case of Hobby Lobby this did not present a problem, which is why the 
outcome was in my view correct. The Greens and the Hahns, owners of the relevant 
corporations, sincerely believed they would be illicitly co-operating with abortion by 
providing employee coverage under the contraceptive mandate. My analysis of the recent 
California case above would lead to the same result: purchasing health insurance to cover 
employees engaged in wrongful activity would not itself be a morally indifferent act. Even if 
it was, the employers would be material but proximate co-operators in serious wrongdoing, 
without a reason sufficient to outweigh the gravity of what they would be involved in. The 
financial penalties for non-compliance would be severe, perhaps threatening the survival of 
the corporations themselves and the livelihoods of many people. Yet it is hard to see how 
proximate co-operation in the taking of life can be justified by a pecuniary penalty for 
refusing.  
What about indispensability? I have assumed in the California case that co-
operation is indispensable.15 In Hobby Lobby, the Court noted that alternative arrangements 
                                                     
13 Hobby Lobby, Slip op: 37-8. 
14 Thomas v. Review Board of the Indiana Employment Security Division (450 U.S. 707 
[1981]); Hernandez v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (490 U.S. 680 [1989]). 
15 Whether it really is does not matter for present purposes; in any case, the availability of 
coverage without employer co-operation is hard to work out given the changing 
circumstances in which the ACA is being implemented. 
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for coverage could be made for employees using federal exchanges and independent action 
by health insurers or third party administrators, without employer involvement.16 Given 
this, the co-operation in Hobby Lobby looks more to be dispensable. Still, the proximity of 
the cooperation and the nature of the evil involved arguably outweigh dispensability. 
Consider the imaginary albeit slightly fanciful case of a large landowner renting his property 
to slave owners. Suppose the government considered slavery to be so important to the 
economy that it required such landowners to provide slavery insurance covering some or all 
of the tenant slave owners’ cost of acquisition and/or maintenance of their slaves. Would 
we not find the purchasing of such insurance to implicate the landowner in so grave a wrong 
that he would be justified in objecting, even if the government were to step in with 
coverage should the landowner refuse to provide it? Moreover, wouldn’t the prospect of 
the landowner going out of business altogether be seen as a price worth paying for resisting 
complicity in such a wrong?  
Whatever one thinks of the outcome in Hobby Lobby, however, the point is that it 
was decided on the sole ground that the objectors sincerely believed they would be illicit co-
operators. That is, the judgment was that purchasing the insurance ‘substantially burdened’ 
the objectors’ exercise of religion under RFRA, not because they would be illicit co-operators 
in what they sincerely believed, according to religious teaching, to be an immoral act, but 
because they sincerely believed that, according to religious teaching, they would be guilty of 
such co-operation. Deciding the case on that ground, however, seems to me a grave 
mistake, whether or not it is the right way of interpreting the jurisprudence on religious 
freedom. 
                                                     
16 Hobby Lobby, Slip Op: 9-10, and n.8. 
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Why, though, does it matter, given that the outcome was correct? Precisely 
because of what has just happened in Zubik v. Burwell, where SCOTUS vacated the previous 
judgments and sent the parties back to the negotiating table to work out an arrangement 
that would be judicially acceptable. Zubik was the consolidation of a number of lower-court 
cases, including most famously Little Sisters of the Poor v. Burwell,17 in which a religious non-
profit organisation also objected to the contraceptive mandate as substantially burdensome 
to freedom of religion under RFRA. The difference from Hobby Lobby, however, is crucial: 
whereas in Hobby Lobby the Supreme Court held that the objectors (owners of closely-held, 
for-profit corporations) were entitled to the same accommodation granted to religious non-
profits, allowing them to opt out of providing the relevant insurance coverage, the objectors 
in Little Sisters of the Poor and then in Zubik objected to the very accommodation itself. 
Now, without going into the technical details of how the accommodation – or ‘opt-
out’ – operates, and although it is fair to say that a good chunk of the argument revolved 
around these minutiae, when it is distilled to its essence the objection was against the very 
idea of opting out. In other words, the objectors argued that by having to give notice, either 
to the Department of Health and Human Services or to their insurer or third-party 
administrator (TPA), that they objected on religious grounds to purchasing the coverage, 
they were illicit co-operators in wrongdoing. They claimed that ‘submitting this notice 
substantially burdens the exercise of their religion, in violation of the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act’.18 
                                                     
17 http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/LSP-Op.pdf (2015) [last 
accessed 6 July 2016]. 
18 Zubik, Slip Op: 3. 
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Now the Supreme Court declined to decide the case on the merits, no doubt under 
the influence of the recent death of Justice Scalia, leaving SCOTUS at a four-four split in 
terms of liberals versus conservatives, broadly speaking. Be that as it may, and despite the 
‘spin’ that somehow Zubik was a ‘victory’ for the objectors,19 the fact remains that at the 
time of writing all prior decisions have been vacated and the parties are required by SCOTUS 
to reach some sort of arrangement. Yet the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals judgment in Little 
Sisters, which effectively no longer stands, is remarkable for the insight it delivers on the 
case. The Federal Court decided by a majority that the opt-out was a ‘de minimis 
administrative task’ that did not substantially burden the objectors’ exercise of religion 
under RFRA or the Constitution.20 Unlike the purchasing of coverage, which constitutes 
compliance with the ACA obligation, opting out by giving notice constitutes a way of 
avoiding compliance with that obligation: it ‘relieves objectors of their coverage 
responsibility, at which point federal law shifts that responsibility to a different actor’.21 As a 
de minimis task – filling in a form or sending an email – the opt-out was not substantially 
burdensome either in terms of the complexity of the task or, more important, in terms of 
making the objectors co-operators in what they sincerely believed to be wrongdoing. As the 
Tenth Circuit put it: ‘Opting out would eliminate their complicity with the Mandate and 
require only routine and minimal administrative paperwork, and they are not substantially 
burdened by the Government’s subsequent efforts to deliver contraceptive coverage in 
their stead.’22 
                                                     
19 See, e.g., http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2016/05/supreme-court-decision-a-
huge-victory-for-little-sisters. 
20 Little Sisters, Slip Op: 42, 45, 50, 51, 78, 79, 84 (header pagination). 
21 Ibid: 60. 
22 Ibid: 82. 
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Yet didn’t the objectors sincerely believe they would ‘trigger’ the coverage simply 
by opting out? Indeed they did, and the District Court in Reaching Souls International v. 
Sebelius emphasised this point,23 which is why it granted an injunction against the 
Government. The Tenth Circuit, however, declined to follow this reasoning. It seems, 
though, that given the reasoning in Hobby Lobby they should have! For recall, the objectors’ 
belief that they would be an illicit co-operator was treated by SCOTUS as a sincerely held 
religious belief that it was not for the Court to second-guess. The District Court in Reaching 
Souls was applying just that reasoning. In Little Sisters, however, the Tenth Circuit Court 
insisted that opting out had the exact opposite effect to implicating the objectors: it relieved 
them of implication in provision of coverage under the mandate. The objectors in Little 
Sisters specifically raised the point that their sincere belief they would be implicated by the 
opt-out had to be accepted as amounting to a substantial burden since that belief would be 
violated by opting out. Yet the Tenth Circuit Court explicitly rejected that argument. It was 
entitled, the Tenth Circuit held, to assess objectively whether a law or regulation amounted 
to a substantial burden,24 which is precisely what it did by judging the opt-out to be an 
eliminator of complicity rather than a facilitator. 
The essence of the judgment comes out well in the way the Court in Little Sisters 
handled the causation question. The objectors argued that opting out of coverage by giving 
notice, whereupon the insurer, TPA, or government stepped in, would ‘trigger’ the coverage 
itself.25 As such, the objectors were painting themselves as having a causal role in the 
provision of objectionable coverage under the mandate. Well, if they sincerely believed they 
                                                     
23 2013 WL 6804259, at http://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-OK-0002-
0001.pdf, pp.13-14, quoted in Little Sisters, Slip Op: 36. 
24 Little Sisters, Slip Op: 48, n.23. 
25 Ibid: 55. 
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had such a role, who is the court to disagree, given Hobby Lobby? It looks, on the face of it, 
that the Circuit Court gets itself into knots on precisely this issue. It affirms that ‘opting out 
is necessarily a but-for cause of someone else’ providing the coverage – whether the 
insurer, the TPA, or the government.26 But the Court then goes on to say that the objectors 
‘do not “cause” contraceptive coverage by exercising their ability to opt out.’27 So which is 
it, and why the scare quotes around ‘cause’? 
It seems to me the Tenth Circuit Court is wrestling with the problem of giving an 
objective analysis of co-operation in this case while respecting the objectors’ honest beliefs 
about what they are doing. The term ‘but-for cause’ is not defined, but presumably the 
Court means that on a simple counterfactual test the objectors, by opting out, do cause the 
coverage: if they were not to opt out, coverage would not be provided by an independent 
agent, viz. the TPA, the insurer, the government, or some combination thereof. But even 
that is not quite right. If the employer were to resist and do nothing, you can be sure that 
one of the other independent agents, i.e. not paid by the employer and not objecting to the 
coverage, would provide it. If the employer were to opt out by giving notice, the same 
would apply. If the employer were simply to go ahead and waive their objection, it is true 
that no independent agent would step in, since it would be the employer themselves footing 
the bill, with the other agents working with or on behalf of the employer to facilitate the 
process. In the latter scenario, then, the employer would be a cause in the counterfactual 
sense. But comparison with that scenario is not the right one to make. By analogy, consider 
                                                     
26 Ibid: 66. 
27 Ibid: 68. Both quotations occur specifically in the context of self-insured employers and 
their TPAs, since Justice Baldock’s partial dissent (pp.109-33), whilst agreeing with most of 
what the majority held, distinguished the case of TPAs. I will not get into the details of that 
issue; the point is that the Court is quite clear that what it says in these quotations applies a 
fortiori to employers who are not self-insured via TPAs. 
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the case of a conscientious objector to serving in the military – the comparison often made 
by the courts in these recent cases. Suppose he protested that by notifying the government 
of his objection to serving, he would be a counterfactual cause of someone else’s serving, 
and so would be somehow ‘triggering’ a third party’s participation in the military, a form of 
illicit ‘but-for’ causality. Is this really plausible? What ground could the conscientious 
objector give for this reading of his situation? It seems the only available one is that the 
remaining alternative course of action was for the objector himself to waive his objection 
and be the one to take up arms instead! In other words, if an objector is to be taken 
seriously in their claim of being a counterfactual cause of X, the comparison has to be with 
an alternative scenario in which they are not a cause of X at all, not an alternative in which 
the objector himself would be a direct, personal cause of X. 
Returning to Little Sisters, then, the problem is that the relevant alternative 
scenarios would not prevent coverage being provided, as the Federal Court itself 
recognised.28 If the objectors resist altogether, i.e. do not opt out but sit on their hands 
instead, a third party will still intervene. If the objectors opt in, they will be the cause 
themselves. So, from the counterfactual causation point of view, if there is any co-operation 
by the objectors it is highly dispensable and hence easier to justify than if the opt-out were 
absolutely necessary for any coverage to be provided.29 So what could the Tenth Circuit 
Court have meant by initially saying that opting-out was a ‘but-for’ cause of the coverage? 
Perhaps it had in mind the implicit comparison by the objectors to the case where they 
footed the bill instead. As we have just seen, however, such a comparison is of no avail. Or 
                                                     
28 Ibid: 68. 
29 As Justice Baldock, partially dissenting, thought was the case with self-insured plaintiffs 
and their TPAs. 
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perhaps the Court was merely giving a nod to the objectors’ sincere belief that they were a 
‘but-for’ cause of the coverage. In the end, however, the Court simply could not hold back 
from giving a dispassionate analysis of the causal situation, nor should it have done 
otherwise. I think we should interpret the Court as saying something like the following: ‘If 
the objectors sincerely believe they are in some way causally responsible for the coverage 
should they opt out, they can have their belief. In some bare sense, a “but-for” sense 
involving a comparison on some dimension or other, opting out is a cause. But causation is 
not complicity. You do not become a co-operator, let alone a co-operator in wrongdoing, 
merely by being a bare cause.’ 
If that is what the Tenth Circuit meant, they grasped the situation correctly. Opting 
out is no more a form of co-operation than walking away when there is no duty to act, even 
though by walking away someone else will do something to which you object. Of course the 
devil can be in the detail, which was the subject of much analysis both by the Tenth Circuit 
and in oral argument before the Supreme Court. There is no room to discuss all of that here. 
Suffice it to say that in no way was any form of opt-out available to the objectors an 
authorization, explicit or implicit, for anyone else to go ahead and provide coverage. There 
was no ‘permission slip’, as the objectors complained; on the contrary, as the Tenth Circuit 
Court observed, ‘The government is not compelling the plaintiffs to endorse or license 
something they consider objectionable; instead, the government is allowing them to decline 
a legal responsibility while requiring another party to perform it in their stead.’30 
The distinction seems to me impeccable. An opt-out, by its very nature, does not 
meet the definition of a co-operative deed, one that assists a principal agent in carrying out 
                                                     
30 Little Sisters, Slip Op: 66, n.36. 
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a primary act. It is certainly not formal co-operation, but neither is it material. The objector 
cannot say: ‘I am a material co-operator by opting out, since I know that by doing so the 
principal agent will provide that to which I object’. One might as well say that, by running 
away from a riot in order to protect oneself, one is assisting the rioters. Now there might be 
a good reason not to run away, just as there might be a good reason not to opt out: one 
might be able to help stop the riot in the former case, and in the latter one might be able to 
stop the objectionable primary act by not opting out (although, as already noted, this was 
highly unlikely in the case under discussion, except perhaps for TPAs if Justice Baldock’s 
partial dissent is correct). But that is different from saying that by opting out one is a co-
operator. Merely being knowingly involved, in some bare causal sense, perhaps merely 
counterfactual, in the occurrence of some state of affairs does not make one a co-operator. 
To be a material co-operator, one has knowingly to assist the primary agent; when one opts 
out, one does not do this. In such a case, questions of proximity and the like do not even 
arise. 
So the Tenth Circuit in Little Sisters accurately assessed the situation and implicitly 
resiled from the reasoning in Hobby Lobby without saying as much. In his partial dissent, 
however, Justice Baldock clearly and explicitly recognises the problem, albeit he does not 
see it as a problem. So we have him citing lower-court judges who held that even if 
‘religious organizations are misguided in thinking that this scheme . . . makes them complicit 
in facilitating contraception or abortion’,31 that is not for the courts to second-guess. Justice 
Baldock adds: ‘Hobby Lobby supports this position well.’32 Nevertheless, he does not pursue 
                                                     
31 Baldock J in Little Sisters, Slip Op: 111, citing dissent of Kavanaugh J in Priests For Life v. 
HHS, No. 13-5368 (2015), Slip Op: 35, at http://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-
courts/cadc/13-5368/13-5368-2015-05-20.pdf?ts=1432159255 [last accessed 7 July 2016]. 
32 Little Sisters, Slip Op: 111. 
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this issue and goes on instead to focus on a possible technical distinction between insured 
plaintiffs, where he agrees with the majority, and self-insured plaintiffs using TPAs, where 
he argues the plaintiffs’ sincere beliefs align with reality. 
For my purposes, the point is that some judges do think that mere sincerity is 
enough when it comes to RFRA cases, and as a matter of fact Hobby Lobby supports this 
view. I submit that this is an absurd position to be in. One might salvage the situation by 
arguing that, just as Justice Baldock did with sincerity and reality in the case of self-insured 
plaintiffs, so in Hobby Lobby what was really going on was that purchasing coverage, to 
which the owners objected, was clearly not morally neutral, as I suggested earlier in 
discussing the situation in California. On this line of reasoning, the sincere belief of the 
owners that they would be illicit (material) co-operators was grounded in reality, and so no 
deep analysis was needed of what the conditions for illicit co-operation actually were.  
Yet this is mere speculation; on the face of it, Hobby Lobby does support the ‘mere 
sincerity’ view, which is troubling because it strictly does allow that RFRA applies to a 
sincere belief that an opt-out can be a means of illicit co-operation.33 If sincerity is enough, 
then by the reasoning in Hobby Lobby a court might allow a RFRA claim by an employee of a 
non-objecting corporation, who was required on pain of dismissal to take the company mail 
to the post office – including health insurance contracts the employee found objectionable. 
Although the employee’s co-operation would be both remote and dispensable, her sincere 
belief that she was an illicit co-operator could not be gainsaid on the most obvious 
interpretation of Hobby Lobby.  
                                                     
33 Assuming that it is a genuine opt-out, i.e. that it is not something else in disguise. And we 
must add the usual ‘all things being equal’ rider. 
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The courts should not allow sincerity to be enough. What they have to do, and 
what the Supreme Court, for reasons one can understand, ducked in Hobby Lobby, is to 
articulate some general, reasonable, and objective principles of co-operation that would 
enable a dispassionate analysis of where a conscientious objector might stand, whatever 
their sincerely held beliefs. Justice Alito was quite right to assert in Hobby Lobby that the 
ethics of co-operation represent ‘a difficult and important question of religion and moral 
philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an 
act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission 
of an immoral act by another.’34 Difficulties notwithstanding, courts need to take notice of 
what both philosophers and theologians have said about this very question. Taking notice of 
moral theology does not entail assessment of the merits of a distinctively religious belief, 
nor does it entail adopting any particular religious position. Rather, it means recognising the 
philosophical merits of the hard work put in by some very clever moral theologians over the 
decades, and using the fruits of that labour to bring some order into what currently 
threatens to be judicial chaos. With freedom of religion and of conscience on the line as 
never before, the least the courts can do is to give objectors a clear pathway through the 
legal thickets. Those asserting their RFRA rights and who are not, objectively, illicit co-
operators in wrongdoing still have many other avenues to make their protests heard, such 
as the time-honoured ones of pressure on Congress, media publicity, and civil disobedience 
to unjust laws. 
                                                     
34 Hobby Lobby, Slip Op: 36, n.34. 
